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Thupten Jinpa explores the historical and intellectual context of Tsongkhapa's philosophy and addresses the critical issues related to questions of development and originality in Tsongkhapa's thought. The work also deals extensively with one of Tsongkhapa's primary concerns, namely his attempts to demonstrate that the Middle Way philosophy's de-constructive analysis does not negate the reality of the everyday world. The central focus of the study is the question of the existence and the nature of self. This is explored in terms of both Tsongkhapa's de-construction of the self and his re-constructive theories of the person. Finally, the work explores the concept of reality that emerges in Tsongkhapa's philosophy, and deals with his understanding of the relationship between critical reasoning, no-self, and religious experience. The interpretations of Tsongkhapa's thought are grounded in the original works, thus enabling Tsongkhapa to speak, as far as possible, in his own voice, while articulating his philosophical thought in language familiar to contemporary western philosophy.
Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle View, Thupten Jinpa, RoutledgeCurzon, Paperback, 248 pages, $54.95
Preface ix Technical Note xii Bibliographical Abbreviations xiv List of Charts and Tables xvi Introduction 1 Context and Methodological Issues 12 The historical contexts of Tsongkhapa's 12 thought Questions of originality and development in 14 Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka philosophy Textual sources for an exegesis of 19 Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka philosophy Tsongkhapa's qualms about early Tibetan 21 understandings of emptiness Delineating the Parameters of Madhyamaka 37 Reasoning Tsongkhapa's reading of the four-cornered 38 argument in Madhyamaka reasoning Distinguishing between the domains of 42 conventional and ultimate discourses Two senses of `ultimate' in the Madhyamaka 46 dialectic Identifying the object of negation 49 That which is `not found' and that which is 54 `negated' A logical analysis of the forms of negation 57 Tsongkhapa's critique of autonomous 63 reasoning Tsongkhapa's Deconstruction of the Self 70 Levels of selfhood according to Tsongkhapa 70 Inadequacies of the Buddhist reductionist 80 theory of no-self The Madhyamaka seven-point analysis of 82 self: A brief outline An analysis of the concept of intrinsic 93 existence No-self as the emptiness of intrinsic 104 existence Personal Identity, Continuity, and the 107 I-consciousness Personal identity and dependent origination 107 The nature of the I-consciousness 123 Individuality, continuity, and rebirth 135 The analogy of the chariot 142 No-Self, Truth, and the Middle Way 148 To exist is to exist in the conventional 148 sense Everyday reality as fiction-like 162 Beyond absolutism, nihilism, and relativism 171 No-self, reason, and soteriology 176 Conclusion 184 Notes 187 Bibliography 227 Wylie Transliteration of Tibetan Names 240 Index 243
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