Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world (comprising various mental states congregated around a self), to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.

The Non-Existence of the Real World, Jan Westerhoff, Oxford University Press, Hardcover, 384 pp, $85.00

Jan Westerhoff was educated at Cambridge and the School of Oriental and African Studies. He has taught Philosophy at the Universities of Oxford and Durham and is presently Professor of Buddhist Philosophy at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, and a Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His books include Ontological Categories (2005), Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (2009), The Dispeller of Disputes (2010), Twelve Examples of Illusion (2010) Reality. A Very Short Introduction (2011), and The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (2018), all published by Oxford University Press.

CONTENTS: The Non-Existence of the Real World
Acknowledgements				xxvii
Preface				xxix
Introduction				xxxi
1	The Non-existence of the External World			1
	1.1	Arguing about the External World		1
	1.2	Three Arguments in Support of an External World		3
	A	The Appearance of Externality		3
	B	Distinguishing Verdical and Illusory States		4
	C	Establishing a Plausible Epistemology		18
	1.3	Irrealism		52
	A	Preliminary Remarks about Irrealism		52
	B	Three Reasons for Irrealism		57
	C	Further Dimensions of the Irrealist Position		65
2	The Non-existence of the Internal World			81
	2.1	Realism about the Internal World?		81
	2.2	The Presumed Certainty of Introspection		82
	2.3	Illusory Certainties		84
	A	The Apparent Stream of Consciousness		85
	B	The Existence of Self
	2.4	The Non-existence of the Internal World		143
3	The non-existence of Ontological Foundations			152
	3.1	Some Preliminary Remarks about Foundationalism		152
	3.2	Arguments for Foundationalism		158
	A	The Regress Argument		158
	B	The Transcendental Argument		167
	C	The Self-refutation Argument		170
	D	The Argument against the Symmetry of Grounding		185
	3.3	Arguments for Non-foundationalism		189
	A	The Argument from Inconsistent Versions		192
	B	The Argument against Intrinsic Properties		195
	C	Arguments from Specific Sciences		213
	3.4	A Potential Difficulty for Circular Non-foundationalism		239
4	A Potential Difficulty for Circular Non-foundationalism			239
	4.1	Some Preliminary Remarks about Higher-Order Grounding		246
	4.2	Ultimately True Theories		253
	4.3	Arguments against Ultimately True Theories		257
	A	The Argument from Coherence		257
	B	The Argument from Semantic Contextualism		267
	C	The Argument from the Failure of Absolutely General Quantification		277
	4.4	Final Remarks
Bibliography				309
Index				329